

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 TUNIS 02199 01 OF 03 311044Z  
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01  
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02  
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05  
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /093 W  
-----311055Z 088443 /11

R 310855Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6235  
INFO USCINCEUR  
CINCUSNAVEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 TUNIS 2199

USCINCEUR & CINCUSNAVEUR FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, TS, US  
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: CERP 0001

FOLLOWING IS THE COUNTRY TEAM'S POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR TUNISIA  
WHICH I AM SUBMITTING TO THE DEPARTMENT IN COMPLIANCE WITH  
INSTRUCTIONS IN STATE 38356:

### A. U.S. INTERESTS

OUT MAJOR INTERESTS IN TUNISIA ARE STRATEGIC, POLITICAL  
AND ECONOMIC. TUNISIA'S LOCATION ON THE SOUTHERN LITTORAL  
OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA COMMANDING THE NARROW PASSAGE  
BETWEEN NORTH AFRICA AND SICILY GIVES IT A GEOPOLITICAL  
IMPORTANCE DISPROPORTIONATE TO ITS SIZE AND RESOURCES.  
EVIDENT THROUGHOUT HISTORY, THIS IMPORTANCE IS AS CLEAR  
TO THE SOVIET UNION AS IT IS TO THE UNITED STATES, AND  
TUNISIA'S PORT FACILITIES ARE SOUGHT AFTER BY BOTH POWERS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TUNIS 02199 01 OF 03 311044Z

FOR USE BY THEIR MEDITERRANEAN FLEETS. OUR POLITICAL  
INTERESTS IN TUNISIA ARE RELATED TO ITS MEMBERSHIP IN  
SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL GROUPINGS (THE ARAB LEAGUE,  
AFRICA, THE "THIRD WORLD", AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT)  
AND THE GOT'S GENERALLY MODERATE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL  
PROBLEMS. TUNISIA AVOIDS LEADERSHIP ROLES THAT LEAD IT  
INTO CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION BUT CONSISTENTLY USES ITS

INFLUENCE IN FAVOR OF DIALOGUE AND COMPROMISE. THIS TUNISIAN POLITICAL ROLE HAS REGULARLY BENEFITED U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES, ESPECIALLY IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, BY ENCOURAGING NEGOTIATION AND COMPROMISE. IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IT HAS WORKED AGAINST FRUITLESS CONFRONTATION AND IN THE NAM IT APPEARS TO BE FOSTERING THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. ALSO IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE, TUNISIA'S MODERATION HAS PRODUCED A RELATIVELY FREE SOCIETY THAT IS A CONSPICUOUS MODEL OF THE ADVANTAGES OF AVOIDING EXTREMIST, RADICAL THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT. ECONOMICALLY, TUNISIA'S EXCELLENT DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE SINCE 1970, IN WHICH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PRIVATE CAPITAL ARE GIVEN ROLES TO PLAY, DEMONSTRATES THE BENEFITS OF A RELATIVELY FREE, MIXED ECONOMY. DIRECT U.S. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS ARE MODEST BUT COULD INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY IF TUNISIA'S PETROLEUM AND GAS RESOURCES PROVE TO BE AS GREAT AS RECENT EXPLORATIONS INDICATE.

## B. OVERVIEWS

1. THE UNITED STATES AND TUNISIA HAVE ENJOYED MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL BILATERAL RELATIONS SINCE TUNISIAN INDEPENDENCE IN 1956. PARTICULARLY IN THE STRATEGIC AREA TUNISIA HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT FRIEND -- ALLOWING US TO MAKE USE OF ITS POSITION WHILE NOT ALLOWING IT TO FALL UNDER THE CONTROL OF HOSTILE FORCES. IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE TUNISIA HAS LONG BEEN AN UNWAVERING ADVOCATE OF COMPROMISE AND A VALUABLE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION FOR US TO MORE RADICAL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TUNIS 02199 01 OF 03 311044Z

ARAB STATES CLOSER TO THE CONFLICT. THESE POLICIES, AS WELL AS TUNISIA'S MODERATE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POLICIES, HAVE NOT BEEN WITHOUT COST TO IT. IT OFTEN FINDS ITSELF AT ODDS WITH ITS LARGE AND POWERFUL NEIGHBOR TO THE WEST WHILE ITS ERRATIC AND RADICAL NEIGHBOR TO THE EAST IS OPENLY HOSTILE. AS TUNISIA'S AGING NATIONAL LEADER WITH-DRAWS FROM ACTIVE POLITICAL LIFE, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM FACES NEW DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CHALLENGES THAT COULD PLACE IN JEOPARDY THE MODERATE POLICIES THAT HAVE BENEFITED IT AND THE UNITED STATES.

2. WHILE LIBYA APPEARS TO BE THE CLEARER THREAT TO THE CURRENT TUNISIAN REGIME--SUPPORTING RADICAL SUBVERSIVES AND SEEKING TO DENY TUNISIA ACCESS TO PROMISING AND BADLY NEEDED OFF-SHORE PETROLEUM RESERVES--ALGERIA IS LIKELY TO BE THE MORE SERIOUS, LONG TERM THREAT. LESS OPENLY HOSTILE TO TUNISIA AND CURRENTLY MAKING CONCILIATORY GESTURES, THE GOA ESPOUSES DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL CAUSES THAT ARE FAR MORE RADICAL THAN TUNISIA'S. IN THE

CASE OF THE DECOLONIZATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARA DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ALGERIA AND TUNISIA PRODUCED A RARE PUBLIC HOSTILITY. THESE DEEP SEATED DIFFERENCES HAVE APPARENTLY LED ALGERIA TO GIVE A LEADING TUNISIAN OPPOSITION FIGURE WHO SHARES ALGERIAN SOCIALIST THEORIES IMPORTANT FINANCIAL, PROPAGANDA AND MORAL SUPPORT. PRESUMABLY HE IS BEING HELD IN THE WINGS FOR USE IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-BOURGUIBA PERIOD TO BRING ABOUT A TUNISIAN REGIME MORE IN LINE WITH ALGERIAN POLICY AND IDEOLOGICAL GOALS.

3. THE KEY ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IS THE TRANSITION TO THE POST-BOURGUIBA PERIOD. PRIME MINISTER HEDI NOUIRA HAS, IN LARGE PART, BEEN PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL POLICIES OF THE LAST SEVEN YEARS. CONSTITUTIONALLY, HE IS BOURGUIBA'S SUCCESSOR AND WILL ASSUME THE PRESIDENCE UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. POLITICALLY, HOWEVER, NOUIRA HAS YET TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SATISFACTION OF MOST  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TUNIS 02199 01 OF 03 311044Z

TUNISIANS THAT HE HAS THE CHARISMATIC APPEAL NEEDED TO SEE HIM AND THE CURRENT REGIME THROUGH ABNORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 TUNIS 02199 02 OF 03 311054Z  
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01  
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02  
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05  
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /093 W  
-----311056Z 088679 /11

R 310855Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6236  
INFO USCINCEUR  
/CINCUSNAVEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 TUNIS 2199

USCINCEUR & CINCUSNAVEUR FOR POLADS

SO FAR, NOUIRA HAS BEEN LUCKY AND HE ADMITS HIMSELF THAT THE HEAVENS HAVE VOTED FOR HIM BY PROVIDING TUNISIA WITH ADEQUATE RAINFALL SINCE HE ASSUMED OFFICE. GIVEN FAVORABLE CONDITIONS, HIS POLICIES ARE THE ONES MOST LIKELY TO QUARANTEE TUNISIA GROWTH AND STABILITY IN THE FUTURE, BUT THE "MANDATE OF HEAVEN" COULD ALSO CHANGE MAKING NOUIRA'S POLICIES LESS SECURE AND TUNISIA MORE VULNERABLE TO ITS ENEMIES. IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE CONDITIONS DO NOT APPEAR LIKELY TO REMAIN AS FAVORABLE AS IN RECENT YEARS.

-- PETROLEUM PRODUCTION IS DECLINING AND WILL CONTINUE DOWNWARD UNLESS TUNISIA GAINS ACCESS TO PROMISING OFF-SHORE RESERVES.

-- PHOSPHATE MARKETS HAVE RECOVERED FROM THEIR 1975 LOWS BUT THIS IMPORTANT SECTOR OF THE TUNISIAN ECONOMY REMAINS WEAK AND VULNERABLE TO FLUCTUATING MARKETS.

-- UNEMPLOYMENT OF 15 PER CENT, MOST OF IT COMPOSED OF YOUNG PEOPLE WHO HAVE NEVER HELD A JOB, CONTINUES TO SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TUNIS 02199 02 OF 03 311054Z

RESIST AGGRESSIVE GOT MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND THREATENS LONG TERM ECONOMIC AND POLITIC IR ABILITY AND PAST HIGH POPULATION GROWOH RATES PROMISE LITTLE RELIEF IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

-- TUNISIA'S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR, SUPPORTING 60 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION, REMAINS WEAK AND IS NOW THREATENED WITH A SERIOUS DROGHT THAT WILL REUDCE GRAIN PRODUCTION IN 1977 BY AT LEAST 30 PER CENT FROM PLANNED LEVELS. A MAJOR CROP FAILURE, WHICH IS A GROWING POSSIBILITY FOR THIS YEAR, COULD HAVE DEVASTATING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.

4. ADDED TO THESE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS, TUNISIA WILL BE FACED WITH OTHER DEVELOPMENTS THAT WILL HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON ITS ABILITY TO CONTINUE THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLICIES THAT HAVE FAVORED US:

-- ITS TRADITIONAL AID DONORS WILL CONTINUE TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GOT'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

-- OPPOSITION GROUPS WILL STEP UP THEIR ATTACKS ON THE REGIME AND ITS POLICIES, NOTABLY ITS QUIET ALIGNMENT WITH WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES.

-- THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PRC WILL, IN CONTRAST

TO TRADITIONAL AID DONORS, BE INCREASING THEIR ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND THEIR CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.

-- THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO GAIN GREATER ACCESS TO TUNISIAN PORTS FOR THE USE OF ITS MEDITERRANEAN FLEET.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TUNIS 02199 02 OF 03 311054Z

-- LIBYA UNDER COL. QADHAFI WILL CONTINUE OR STEP UP ITS HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE GOT AS PUNISHMENT FOR TUNISIA'S RENEGING ON THE 1974 MERGER ACCORD. THE GOT'S CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN THE KIND OF SOCIETY IF WANTS AND FOLLOW THE KIND OF POLICIES THAT SERVE OUR INTEREST WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON MOBILIZATION OF TUNISIAN RESOURCES AND POPULAR SUPPORT, BUT IT WILL, OF COURSE, RELY AS WELL ON THE AID OF ITS TRADITIONAL FRIENDS TO SEE IT THROUGH THE DIFFICULT TIMES AHEAD. IN ORDER TO PRESERVE A TUNISIA THAT IS USEFUL TO US WE SHOULD SUPPORT, WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY OUR RESOURCES, THE GOT IN ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES.

#### C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION AND ISSUES

##### 1. STRATEGIC

THE KEY TO TUNISIA'S DEFENSE IS INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY SO THAT DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SUBVERSIVES HAVE NO CHANCE OF UPSETTING THE REGIME. THE GOT CLEARLY RECOGNIZES THIS FACT. IT DEVOTES A MINIMAL PROPORTION OF ITS RESOURCES TO MILITARY DEFENSE WHILE EMPHASIZING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND VIGILANT INTERNAL SECURITY. TUNISIA, HOWEVER, CANNOT REALISTICALLY REMAIN UTTERLY DEFENSELESS TO ARMED INCURSION AND WE SHOULD SUPPORT TUNISIAN PLANS TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE ALSO THAT WE CAN JEOPARDIZE TUNISIA BY CALLING ON IT TO TAKE PUBLIC STANDS IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS THAT ARE DISTINCTLY OUT OF STEP WITH PRESENT CURRENTS IN "THIRD WORLD" AND ARAB POLITICS. WHILE TUNISIA WILL OFTEN DO ITS BEST TO RESPOND TO OUR REQUESTS, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT TUNISIA IS MOST HELPFUL TO US BEHIND THE SCENES WORKING QUIETLY FOR COMPROMISE RATHER THAN TAKING DRAMATIC PUBLIC STANDS THAT CAN ONLY GET IT INTO TROUBLE WITH ITS RADICAL NEIGHBORS. TO PURSUE OUR SECURITY GOALS WE SHOULD:

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TUNIS 02199 02 OF 03 311054Z

A. MAINTAIN FMS CREDITS AT AN ANNUAL LEVEL OF AT LEAST \$25 MILLION, TO AID IN ACQUISITION OF MORE MODERN DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.

B. INCREASE TRAINING FOR TUNISIAN MILITARY IN U.S., ON GRANT BASIS OR AT MINIMAL EXPENSE TO GOT.

C. EXPAND SHORT TERM MILITARY TRAINING COURSES IN TUNISIA EMPHASIZING LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, COMMUNICATION AND OTHER NON-COMBAT SKILLS.

D. MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY ADVISORY FUNCTION IN TUNISIA.

E. CONTINUE HIGH LEVEL DOD/GOT DEFENSE MINISTRY EXCHANGE VISITS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 TUNIS 02199 03 OF 03 311105Z  
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01  
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02  
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05  
TRSY-02 USIA-06 /093 W  
-----311111Z 089129 /11

R 310855Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6237  
INFO USCINCEUR  
CINCUSNAVEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 TUNIS 2199

USCINCEUR & CINCUSNAVEUR FOR POLADS

F. SCHEDULE SIXTH FLEET PORT CALLS IN TUNISIA AT ABOUT CURRENT LEVELS, USING THESE VISITS FOR LOGISTIC AND TRAINING SUPPORT TO TUNISIAN ARMED FORCES AND TO SIGNAL U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE GOT AT CRITICAL PERIODS.

G. ENCOURAGE STRENGTHENED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN

TUNISIA AND FRIENDLY THIRD COUNTRIES (ESPECIALLY FRANCE, ITALY AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY).

## 2. POLITICAL

WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HEALTHY POLITICAL CLIMATE IN TUNISIA THAT WILL FOSTER STABILIOY THROUGH THE TRANSITION TO THE POST-BOURGUIBA PERIOD AND MAKE CONTINUED USE OF TUNISIA AS A TRUSTED ADVISOR ON MIDDLE EAST, NAM AND AFRICAN ISSUES AND A CONDUIT FOR OUR VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST TOTHE PLO.

TO PURSUE OUR POLITICAL GOALS WE SHOULD:

A. CONTINUE EXCHANGE OF HIOH LEVEL VISITS INCLUDING HIGH SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TUNIS 02199 03 OF 03 311105Z

LEVEL PARTICIPATION IN ANNUAL JOINT COMMISSION MEETINGS AND USE THESE VISITS OF FRANK EXCHANGE OV EIWS ON IMPORTANT BILATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL ISSUES9

B. INCREASE ORIENTATION VISITS OF LEADERS FROM KEY SECTORS OF TUNISIAN SOCIETY TOTHE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL VISITOR PROGRAM AND ENCOURAGE SIMILAR PROGRAMS BY PRIVATE AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS.

C. OFFER EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT, THROUGH HIGH LEVEL VISITS, PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, OR SIXTH FLEET PORT CALLS, WHEN PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA PASSES FROM THE SCENE OR AT CRITICAL PERIODS OF REGIONAL STRESS.

D. ENCOURAGE THE REGIME TO ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF POLITICAL FORCES CURRENTLY IN OPPOSITION THAT ARE WILLING TO WORK THROUGH ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS.

E. DEMONSTRATE OUR ACCEPTANCE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION FORCES BY INCLUDING THEIR MEMBERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL VISITOR PROGRAM, WHERE POSSIBLE, AND MAINTAINING REGULAR CONTACT WITH OPPOSITION FIGURES.

F. ADVISE THE GOT THAT SERIOUS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE USG TO CONTINUE ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME.

G. CONTINUE INFORMATION AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS IN TUNISIA THAT FAMILIARIZE THE TUNISIAN PUBLIC WITH THE U.S. AND U.S.G. POLICIES.

## 3. ECONOMIC

THE CURRENT REGIME NEEDS NO FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT TO CONTINUE

ACTIVE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN A MIXED ECONOMY. AN AMBITIOUS  
FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN (TUNISIA'S FIFTH) MAPS OUT A  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TUNIS 02199 03 OF 03 311105Z

PROGRAM THAT THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS WILL TAKE TUNISIA TO THE  
ECONOMIC "TAKE-OFF" POINT. WE SHOULD, WITHIN THE LIMITS  
IMPOSED BY OUR RESOURCES, CONTINUE FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL  
SUPPORT AT CURRENT LEVELS FOR TUNISIA'S EFFORTS AND BE READY  
TO PROVIDE EXTRA ASSISTANCE IF SERIOUS ECONOMIC ADVERSITY  
JEOPARDIZES THE TUNISIANS' CAPACITY TO CARRY THROUGH WITH  
THEIR PLAN. WE SHOULD SUPPORT TUNISIAN EFFORTS TO OBTAIN  
DEVELOPMENT FINANCING FROM NEW SOURCES. IN ANTICIPATION  
OF A GRADUAL PHASEOUT OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EFFORTS,  
WE SHOULD ALSO GIVE GREATER ENCOURAGEMENT TO PRIVATE U.S.  
INVESTMENT IN A GROWING TUNISIAN ECONOMY.

TO PURSUE OUR ECONOMIC GOALS WE SHOULD:

A. CONTINUE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS THROUGH 1981  
WITH PROJECTS KEYED TO GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES IN AGRICULTURE,  
RURAL DEVELOPMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, HEALTH CARE  
AND HOUSING.

B. RESPOND QUICKLY TO GOVERNMENT REQUESTS FOR PL-480 WHEAT  
SALES AS WARRANTED BY THE TUNISIAN CROP SITUATION AND  
U.S. SURPLUS AVAILABILITIES.

C. CONTINUE PEACE CORPS PROGRAMS AT PRESENT LEVELS IN  
COORDINATION WITH OTHER U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.

D. ENCOURAGE OTHER TRADITIONAL DONORS TO  
MAINTAIN CONCESSIONAL ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE PERIOD OF  
THE FIFTH DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

E. MAINTAIN CLOSE COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION WITH THE  
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY (GIP) AND SUPPORT TUNISIAN  
INVESTMENT PROMOTION EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

F. CONTINUE EFFORTS TO REMOVE DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS  
FROM TUNISIAN LAW THAT DISCOURAGE U.S. INVESTMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TUNIS 02199 03 OF 03 311105Z

G. PROMOTE U.S.-TUNISIAN TRADE BY ELIMINATING BARRIERS  
AND LIBERALIZING FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROCEDURES.



H. OBTAIN GREATER DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE SUPPORT FOR  
BILATERAL TRADE PROMOTION EFFORTS AND BROADEN EXIMBANK  
EXPOSURE IN TUNISIA.

I. ENCOURAGE DIRECT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT  
OF TUNISIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY THROUGH EXPLOITATION OF  
OFF-SHORE RESOURCES.

J. ENCOURAGE SETTLEMENT OF TUNISIA'S BORDER DELINEATION  
DISPUTE WITH LIBYA THROUGH CARTOGRAPHIC ASSISTANCE TO  
THE GOT, CLARIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE  
DISPUTE AND ENCOURAGING REFERRAL OF THE DISPUTE TO THE ICJ.

MULCAHY

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLICIES, ANNUAL REPORTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 31-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977TUNIS02199  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770110-0547  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** TUNIS  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t1977031/aaaaaajf.tel  
**Line Count:** 454  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 228707ac-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION NEA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 9  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2931567  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I  
**TAGS:** AMGT, PFOR, TS, US  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/228707ac-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009